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Introduction 
In the post-Cold War period, Africa did not constitute a top strategic priority 
for the U.S.  A 1995 report by the Department of Defence (DoD) listed Africa at the 
bottom of the world’s regions in strategic terms.  In 1998, the National Security 
Strategy of the U.S. confirmed that America’s security interests with regard to 
Africa were limited.  Hence the tendency in the past was to relegate Africa to the 
periphery of American strategy.1 
However, as Metz rightly argued some years ago, such an approach would not 
be wise: the U.S. does indeed have strategic interests in Africa.  After all, from a 
U.S. point of view, serious transnational threats emanate from the region, including: 
state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics trafficking, weapons proliferation, international 
crime, environmental damage, and pandemic disease.  Furthermore, Africa has been 
the scene of recurrent humanitarian crises, often as a result of intra-state armed 
conflict.   
This suggests that the United States should remain in Africa but do 
so in a way that generates the maximum effectiveness from every 
effort.  Clearly promotion of political and economic reform must be 
at the centre of American policy.  But security cannot be 
overlooked.2 
The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002 indicated a 
need for a more focused approach towards Africa:  “In Africa, promise and 
                                                          
1 The author owes thanks to the reviewers for some critical comments and 
thoughtful insights; some of which have been worked into the article. 
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opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty.  This threatens 
both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic 
priority – combating global terror.”  The Administration’s 2006 National Security 
Strategy went even further, identifying Africa as “a high priority for this 
Administration” and recognising that American security depends on partnering with 
Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and to bring so-called ungoverned 
areas3 under the control of effective democracies.4 
This said, on 6 February 2007, the Bush Administration announced its 
intention to create a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command, or 
AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its 
surrounding waters.5  This announcement followed years of discussions within the 
DoD about the merits of some kind of African Command.6  The aim of AFRICOM 
is to strengthen U.S.-African security co-operation and to create new opportunities 
to bolster the capabilities of Africa role-players7 − all of which brought a new 
dimension to U.S. strategic interests in Africa.   
With the advent of the Pentagon’s new AFRICOM, it appears as if U.S. 
foreign and security policies regarding the African continent are in a major period of 
flux.  It appears to be moving towards greater engagement with African role-
players.8  However, this interest in Africa and related developments concerning the 
creation of AFRICOM sparked a vocal reaction and some critical questions and 
remarks from defence and security analysts and other observers in Africa about 
‘renewed interest’ by the U.S. in Africa.  Moreover, it has also elicited some heated 
responses from political role-players on the African continent.  Swart refers to the 
responses as a mixture of anticipation, trepidation, suspicion, scepticism and 
condemnation.  He correctly points out that a number of pitfalls are already 
emerging in the run-up to the establishment of this command initiative, which reflect 
that African governments are wary of being too closely aligned with Washington.9  
In view of the above, this article intends to highlight, discuss and reflect on some of 
the strategic considerations, concerns from African observers, pressing questions 
and future prospects concerning the establishment of AFRICOM. 
Establishing AFRICOM 
Up to the present, U.S. military involvement in Africa has been shared among 
the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
and the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).  EUCOM is responsible for the largest 
swath of the continent, namely North Africa, West Africa and central and southern 
Africa.  CENTCOM covers the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
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Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan, Egypt and the Seychelles.  PACOM is responsible for 
Madagascar and the Indian Ocean area off the African coast.  Given the fact that 
Africa has been subsumed under other regional commands, the continent has never 
really been a priority for the U.S. military.  In the words of Susan Rice, former U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs: “Africa has been divided up and 
been the poor stepchild in each of these different commands and not gotten the full 
attention it deserves”.10 
Against this background the establishment of AFRICOM is linked to the 
transfer and geographical responsibility for Africa from the above commands.  
Having been established as a sub-unified command towards the end of 2007, 
AFRICOM is currently still subordinate to EUCOM.  After achieving full 
operational capability in October 2008 as a stand-alone unified Command, the 
commander of AFRICOM will report to the Secretary of Defence, like all other 
unified commanders in the DoD.11  In eyes of the Pentagon and of the command 
structures, this will effectively put Africa on a par with the Pacific Rim, Europe, 
Latin America, the Middle East and North America.12  Meanwhile, AFRICOM’s 
transition team will use existing facilities at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.  
The plan is to eventually place the headquarters in Africa, and American officials 
are consulting with strategic partners in Africa to identify a suitable location for the 
Command’s headquarters.  The headquarters staff will be tailored to accomplish the 
commands mission13 and there is no plan to have a significant troop presence on the 
African continent. 
In an article in Military Review of January-February 2008, the question is 
rightly asked: “Why AFRICOM?”  This question boils down to three subsidiary 
issues:14 
• Africa was never a number one priority for any unified command.  
• Owing to historical disinterest in the continent, the DoD never developed a 
sizable cadre of dedicated African experts. 
• Africa has never benefited from the advocacy of a four-star commander 
whose undiluted mandate includes helping policymakers understand the 
perspectives of African countries. 
In view of the above, the rationale behind the creation of AFRICOM is of 
particular interest.  According to testimony by a former Commander of EUCOM, 
General James Jones, to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2006, EUCOM’s 
staff is now spending more than half their time on Africa issues, in stark contrast to 
previous years.  More recently, it was testified that the increasing strategic 
significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest security stability challenge 
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to EUCOM.  Specifically, the “large ungoverned area” in Africa, HIV/AIDS, 
corruption, weak governance and poverty throughout the continent are perceived as 
key factors in the security stability issues that affect every African state.  Hence, 
members of Congress have expressed an interest in the creation of an African 
Command, and in 2006, Senator Russ Feingold introduced legislation requiring a 
feasibility study on the establishment of AFRICOM.15 
According to Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, who has been appointed 
Executive Director of AFRICOM, the DoD is creating the Command as Africa is 
growing in military, strategic and economic importance in global affairs.  The U.S. 
is, therefore, seeking more effective ways for the DoD to help prevent and respond 
to humanitarian crises, improve co-operative efforts to stem transnational terrorism 
and to sustain enduring efforts that will contribute to African unity and bolster 
security on the African continent.16  AFRICOM’s mission is, therefore, intended to 
promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional 
organisations, such as the African Union (AU), to help strengthen stability and 
security on the continent through improved security capability, military 
professionalism and accountable governance.  The Command’s military operations 
would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.17  Importantly, Africa’s 
growing strategic importance to U.S. strategic interests is clearly acknowledged.  
This relates to  
… Africa’s role in the Global War on Terror and the potential threats 
posed by ungoverned spaces (e.g. failed states); the growing 
importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy 
resources; and ongoing concern for the continent’s many 
humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and more general challenges, 
such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS.18 
Of particular interest is that AFRICOM will seek interagency coordination 
with the State Department, USAID and other government agencies, and that it will 
have a larger non-DoD civilian staff than the other combatant commands.  Non-DoD 
civilian staff positions will include senior leadership positions, senior advisors and 
subject experts.  A senior U.S. diplomat, Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, was even 
appointed as Deputy to the Commander for civil-military activities.  As such, Yates 
is the first non-DoD civilian to be integrated into the command structure of a unified 
command.  She will be responsible for co-ordination of the command’s activities 
with other U.S. government agencies and furthermore be overseeing the 
implementation and execution of AFRICOM’s programmes and operations.19  All of 
this seems to imply that AFRICOM will execute the traditional tasks of other U.S. 
commands, but execute this in a context of interagency co-operation to ensure an 
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approach that would go beyond the traditional paradigm.  Rather than focusing on 
“war-fighting”, AFRICOM will focus on “war prevention”, according to the first 
AFRICOM commander, Army General William E. (Kip) Ward.20  In fact, planners 
show considerable interest in “soft power” issues such as health, infrastructural 
rehabilitation, the environment, economic development, security-sector reform, 
conflict attenuation, and other human-security angles.21 
Finally, there was much speculation about a possible headquarters location.  
Some raised the point that Morocco is the only geographically and politically viable 
location for headquartering AFRICOM because it is a neutral Muslim state that has 
proved itself willing to work with the U.S. to combat the growth of radical Islam in 
Africa.  In addition, it was felt that there could be some lesser placement in the Gulf 
of Guinea, east Africa and southern Africa.  Others suggested Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, as a viable location for the headquarters because it is the AU seat, and the 
U.S. entertains good relations with the Ethiopian government.22 
Reaction and concerns 
Many critical questions about AFRICOM have been posed in recent times − 
and these questions are not confined to African observers and analysts.  Robert 
Munson, a major in the U.S. Air Force Reserve and currently serving an active duty 
tour as Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air 
Command and Staff College, boldly asks: “Break things or help.  This is a 
significant question in light of the formation of the new Africa Command”.23  Such 
questions, it is argued, should be viewed against the need for the U.S. to return to the 
American image produced after World War II, when the world did not see the U.S. 
as a conquering behemoth, intent on imposing its views on the rest of the world, but 
instead as a country willing to work multilaterally to solve the world’s problems.24 
More importantly, the announcement concerning the creation of AFRICOM 
sparked quite a vocal response from African commentators.  For instance, Mark 
Malan, a South African currently operating in Washington DC, points out that a 
quick glance at the titles of recent articles on AFRICOM in the African press 
indicates that the Command is perceived as a threat.  In a testimony before the 
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. 
Senate, Malan (a former South African military officer and respected African 
security analyst) titled his paper, ‘AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing’.  
Malan’s main concern is that DoD officials continue to emphasise the non-military 
roles of AFRICOM, such as humanitarian assistance, civic action, and response to 
natural disasters, and this kind of ‘messaging’ has amplified African concerns about 
a militarisation of U.S. development policy and humanitarian assistance in Africa.  
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For Malan, AFRICOM is being presented as a tool for integrating U.S. military, 
political, and humanitarian objectives under a unified military command. 25 
Malan’s concern is that in Africa, mass displacement, hunger and disease is 
often the humanitarian fallout of political failures.  In order to address such 
challenges effectively, there may be a need for military strength, political direction 
and humanitarian action, but this could not be done by integrating these elements 
under AFRICOM.  “There can at best be good liaison between and perhaps 
coordination between humanitarian, developmental and military actors – but not 
integration.”  Moreover, Malan’s concern is that in some parts of the world, like Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the face of U.S. foreign policy is clearly a military one, and that in 
Africa the DoD appears to be putting a civilian mask on the face of a combatant 
command with its marketing pitch for AFRICOM.26 
Abel Esterhuyse, a South African academic and military strategist, likewise 
confirms that Africans are sceptical about AFRICOM.  According to Esterhuyse, 
Americans should be open and transparent on their interests in Africa.  Africa, he 
stresses, experiences a denial on the part of Americans concerning America’s real 
strategic interests in Africa, and this is aggravated by an aggressive and militarised 
way of addressing problems in Iraq and Afghanistan.27  According to Esterhuyse, the 
problem is that the image of U.S. foreign policy in many parts of Africa is informed 
by U.S. military actions in other parts of the world, especially in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  This image is strongly associated with the U.S. military profile in general and 
that of an aggressive use of military force in particular.  It also stands in stark 
contrast to efforts by DoD functionaries to attach a ‘soft power’ approach to 
AFRICOM and efforts to downplay a hard-core military role for the U.S. in Africa.  
A pertinent question is: how long will such ‘soft-power’ approach last before 
AFRICOM shows its true character and Africa or certain countries in Africa will be 
“Iraqed”.28  He also shares Malan’s contention that Africans are afraid of the 
possibility that Americans would militarise their humanitarian action in Africa, and 
that American defence personnel may well play a significant role in such action.  
Esterhuyse furthermore points towards African concerns that AFRICOM is masked 
behind a humanitarian face in order to ensure a soft landing for the Command on the 
Africa continent.  According to Esterhuyse, American humanitarian commitment 
could indeed be questioned in view of the U.S.’s inaction in past or recent 
humanitarian crises, such as those in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Darfur (Sudan).  
Hence the question is whether the U.S. is not simply interested in pursuing and 
advancing its own interests on the African continent. 29 
Gerrie Swart, a political scientist at the University of South Africa, also asserts 
that there is a predominantly negative sentiment among African leaders about the 
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establishment of AFRICOM.  A great sense of reluctance to embrace the advent of 
AFRICOM exists, even though it is known and often pointed out that there is 
already a substantial American presence in Africa.  This presence does not put 
African observers and analysts at ease, and African states in general continue to 
adopt a wary approach towards the establishment of AFRICOM.  It is feared by 
some that AFRICOM will not only militarise U.S.-African relations, but also those 
African countries in which it will be located.  This could even lead to greater support 
or sympathy for radical militants opposed to the U.S. and make Americans targets of 
violence.30  Swart further purports that the U.S. will find it difficult to convince 
Africans that America is unselfish.  According to him, Americans would find it 
troublesome to defend AFRICOM’s “altruistic approach” if the U.S.’s new strategic 
interest in Africa is merely working towards the advancement of U.S. interests.  To 
this end, Americans will need to inform Africans of AFRICOM’s intended projects 
by means of ongoing diplomacy in order to make this a viable and successful 
project. 31 
The above-mentioned sentiments are also shared by other analysts on the 
African continent.  Tidiane Sy, a journalist reporting from Dakar, Senegal, wrote 
that there is widespread scepticism about the role of AFRICOM.  American interests 
are associated with the ongoing competition for resources, especially oil, which 
should be viewed against the background of competition between Japan, China and 
the U.S.  Sy also reported that some observers are of the opinion that AFRICOM 
could militarise political problems on the African continent in the sense that the 
“threat of terrorism” could be used as a pretext by some governments to deal with 
internal political problems and dissatisfied communities as if these were tantamount 
to terrorism, and thus would deal with such challenges in a military way.  In the 
words of Prof Ettanibi Alemika of the Jos University in Nigeria: “They would send 
troops rather than to negotiate”.32 
Kenneth Mpyisi, Director of the Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa 
and a former career diplomat with the Ugandan Foreign Service, outlines a 
somewhat more nuanced approach towards AFRICOM.  He argues that the first 
argument is not on the form of AFRICOM, but rather on its motive and timing.  The 
proponents of this view are interested in questions about why the need for 
AFRICOM, and why now?  According to this view, AFRICOM is not only a smack 
on the continent’s sovereignty, but an attempt by the U.S. to secure its own interests 
– specifically concerning the increased economic and strategic importance of Africa.  
The second argument basically implies that any outright rejection of AFRICOM 
would not be wise, considering the inability of Africa to respond to and sustain some 
of its peacekeeping and peace building missions.  Therefore, African role-players 
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should rather engage AFRICOM in a constructive manner that addresses the security 
concerns of both the U.S. and Africa.33  
Political responses 
Mpyisi argues that amidst concern and excitement about AFRICOM, there is a 
lack of concerted and unified response from the continent.34  Swart likewise purports 
that achieving consensus amongst Africa’s leadership on AFRICOM could be very 
difficult.35  However, thus far, the creation of AFRICOM has not been welcomed 
with open arms at the political level in Southern Africa. More armed U.S. soldiers 
are not welcome in Africa, said South African Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota on 
29 August 2007.  Briefing the media, he made it clear that the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) defence ministers decided that no member states 
would host more armed U.S. soldiers.  Lekota further indicated that this was also the 
continental position of the AU.  Any country that allowed itself to become a base for 
AFRICOM would have to live with the consequences, Lekota warned.  This could 
amount to neighbouring African countries refusing to cooperate with AFRICOM.  
According to Lekota, 
Africa has to avoid the presence of foreign forces on its soil, 
particularly if any influx of soldiers might affect relations between 
sister countries … nevertheless, the SADC has adopted a position 
that it would be better if the U.S. did it from a distance.   
Shortly before these statements, Lekota apparently did not respond to U.S. 
requests for him to meet the AFRICOM commander, Army General William E. 
(Kip) Ward.36   
In response to these negative sentiments, one could rightly argue that that 
much of what is currently perceived to be the ‘African popular sentiment’ on 
AFRICOM is the product of South Africa’s position and regional influence, as 
opposed to the broader sentiments in different countries.  However, Algeria and 
Libya earlier ruled out hosting AFRICOM after both countries made it clear to U.S. 
diplomats that they were opposed to the new Command being based in their 
countries or any of their neighbouring countries.37  In view of the above, it is clear 
that the initial political response from the African leadership to the establishment 
and future existence of AFRICOM has not been favourable.  Only the Liberian 
President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, openly favoured the creation of AFRICOM, 
although she has been under pressure from fellow Liberians to abandon her stance 
that Liberia could be willing to host the AFRICOM headquarters.38  Be that as it 
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may, it is still early days and one could somehow find that support for AFRICOM 
might be in the interest of some African states but not others. 
Functionaries in the Bush Administration and Pentagon officials seem to be 
acutely aware of the criticism on and scepticism about the creation of AFRICOM.  
“This is not about a scramble for the continent,” said Theresa Whelan, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Defence for African Affairs.39  According to Ryan Henry, 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defence for Policy, there are some myths 
about AFRICOM: that AFRICOM is to be an anti-terrorism unit, that AFRICOM is 
an attempt to counter Chinese influence on the continent, and that it is an effort to 
ensure access to resources, specifically oil.40  Whelan likewise asserted that some 
people believe that Americans are establishing AFRICOM solely to fight terrorism 
or to secure oil or to discourage China.  “This is not true,” she maintained.  “Natural 
resources represent Africa’s current and future wealth, but in an open-market 
environment,” she continued.  “AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater 
capacity to assure their own security.”41 
Shortly after the announcement of AFRICOM’s intended establishment, 
Pentagon officials started to address and dispel what was considered to be 
misconceptions about the new command.  It was especially stressed that AFRICOM 
would not be created −  
• in response to Chinese presence on the African continent; 
• solely for the effort of enhanced counterterrorism; and 
• to secure resources, such as oil. 
It has also been stressed that AFRICOM − 
• will not result in large-scale deployment of U.S. forces on the African 
continent; 
• will not result in a dramatic increase in financial resources devoted to 
Africa; and 
• will promote regional security and stability while coordinating U.S. 
support for African leaders.42 
These issues will be further explored in the section below. 
American strategic interests in Africa 
It has already been explained that traditionally the U.S. has not been a major 
player in the security environment of sub-Saharan Africa, relying instead on other 
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role-players to provide outside assistance to African states.  Today, it is appropriate 
to revisit this position.  In the past years, American security and strategic analysts 
have urged for a re-evaluation and refinement of American strategy towards 
Africa.43  Since the early 2000s, it was argued that the U.S. seeks an Africa where 
Americans can do business and cooperate in resolving shared problems, but where 
the need for direct U.S. military involvement is minimal.  Politically, the U.S. would 
like to see competent, accountable governance with regular, peaceful transfer of 
power.  There should also be institutionalised methods for public input into open 
policymaking procedures.  Furthermore, the rule of law should be the norm with 
respect to human rights and minorities.  Economically, the U.S. would like to see 
sustainable, ecologically sound development in Africa.  In security terms, the U.S. 
seeks peace and stability, and resolution of conflicts that cause complex 
emergencies, solutions to Africa’s refugee problems, the building of sound civil-
military relations with civilian control of the military, abandonment of proxy 
aggression, and military forces that are able to protect national security, but which 
are not an impediment to economic growth and development.44 
It should be clear that the U.S. already has a military presence on the African 
continent, which is expected to be continued or expanded under AFRICOM.  Firstly, 
since 2002, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has 
based roughly 1 700 troops at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.  The task force is mainly 
focused on terrorist activities in the region, and was reportedly involved in tracing 
down leaders of Somalia’s Islamic Courts in December 2006.  Secondly, the Trans-
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) similarly focuses on counterterrorism.  
It seeks to dampen Islamic extremism and locate and eliminate terrorists by 
providing counterterrorist training programmes and weapons to North African states.  
Thirdly, the U.S. military has significantly expanded its naval presence in the Gulf 
of Guinea, a stretch of coastline between Nigeria and Angola where oil supplies are 
becoming of the utmost interest to the U.S.  There are now continuous patrols in the 
region, up from almost no activity in 2004, while the U.S. also conducted security 
co-operation activities with a number of countries, including Angola, Ghana and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.45 
Whatever has been said about AFRICOM, one matter is certain: The intended 
establishment of AFRICOM officially reflects a refinement and should be viewed 
against the background of an evolution in U.S. policymakers’ perceptions of 
American strategic interests in Africa.  According to Mbachu, interplaying in West 
Africa specifically is a volatile mix of strategic minerals – oil, uranium and 
diamonds – and milieus where radical Islamic groups are a potential threat.  Not 
only is the U.S. keen to protect its oil supplies from the Gulf of Guinea, it is also 
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keen that uranium from Niger and diamonds from Sierra Leone and Liberia do not 
fall into the hands of militant organisations.  This should be viewed against the 
background of reports of al-Qaida using the trade of diamonds controlled by rebels 
during Sierra Leone’s civil war to funnel funds and evade official banking systems 
with the help of Liberia under Charles Taylor.  U.S. interests in the region are 
furthermore increasingly of strategic importance, with oil found all along the Gulf of 
Guinea.  Even inland in the desert, including the states of Niger, Chad and Sudan, 
significant oil activities are the order of the day and of great interest to the U.S.  The 
U.S. has also shown concern about radical Islamic influences in parts of West 
Africa, where anti-Western sentiments are strong.  All of these seem to have 
contributed to the US decision to set up an Africa Command.46 
In a report submitted to the U.S. Congress, Lauren Ploch, analyst in African 
affairs at the Congressional Research Service states that five factors have shaped 
increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past decade: HIV/Aids, oil, global trade, 
armed conflict and terror.  Specifically, as far as oil is concerned, Ploch points out 
that Africa recently surpassed the Middle East as the U.S.’s largest supplier of crude 
oil.  While Nigeria has long been Africa’s oil giant, Angola has in recent years 
become the ninth largest oil supplier to the U.S.  Further, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
and the Congo Republic also produce hundreds of barrels every day.47 
Nigeria is still Africa’s largest supplier of oil and is the fifth largest global 
supplier of oil to the U.S.  Instability in the Niger Delta region has reduced output by 
as much as 25 per cent at some point48 – which is clearly not in the American 
interest.  In this context, analysts point out that the sub-Saharan Africa oil 
production surpassed 4 million barrels a day in 2000 – more than Iran, Venezuela or 
Mexico.  Currently, the U.S. obtains about 16 per cent of its oil from sub-Saharan 
Africa − almost as much as from Saudi Arabia.  And, according to intelligence 
projections, the proportion of African oil supplies to the U.S. will reach 25 per cent 
by 2015, surpassing the entire Persian Gulf.  The vast majority of this will be 
exported to the U.S. from the Gulf of Guinea.  Currently, all along Africa’s Atlantic 
coast, exploration companies are boasting new offshore finds.  Investment in West 
Africa by big U.S. companies − such as ExxonMobil and Chevron-Texaco, as well 
as by smaller ones, such as Amerada Hess and Ocean Energy − are about to total an 
estimated $10 billion annually.  The Bush-Administration is very much aware of this 
and some lobby groups with members of the U.S. oil industry are already 
considering the Gulf of Guinea as an area of vital interest.  To this end, Walter 
Kantsteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, earlier declared: “African oil is 
of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase and become more important as 
we go forward”.49 
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Furthermore, current U.S. security policy is driven in large part by the Global 
War on Terror, which the Bush Administration has identified as a top security 
priority.  From a U.S. point of view, terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Dar es 
Salaam and Nairobi in 1998, on targets in Mombassa in 2002, and more recently in 
Algiers in 2007, have highlighted the threat of terrorism.  DoD officials have 
emphasised the need to work with African role-players in this regard.  Of primary 
concern is challenges posed by so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’, defined as physical or 
non-physical area(s) where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to 
exercise control.  And this could arise or result from a variety of causes, including 
poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, and related 
factors.  If left unattended or unaddressed, failed states, humanitarian disasters, and 
ungoverned areas could become safe havens for terrorists. 
Finally, it has already been explained that Pentagon officials have maintained 
that AFRICOM is not created in response to Chinese presence on the African 
continent.  Yet, this can not simply be ignored or discarded as a factor of relevance.  
According to Miller, China has grown at an average of 10 percent per annum and its 
economic power has raised the strongest challenge to U.S. political power since the 
threat of Eastern Europe as a power bloc during the Cold War period.   
Global power configurations have seen China emerging as a 
countervailing pull to US dominance in multilateral institutions at 
the global level, as well as initiating bilateral arrangements with 
countries that allow them to sidestep US dominance, particularly in 
loan-dependent regions such as Africa …  The Chinese challenge 
now presents the world with a potential turning point in global 
hegemonic forces.50 
China’s economic links with Africa have been strengthened through the 
multilateral signing of the Beijing Declaration during the gathering of the China-
Africa Forum in Beijing in 2000.  This declaration outlines a firm commitment 
between African countries and China for increased co-operation in economic and 
international affairs and actually created a new political and economic order between 
China and Africa.51  Much of this relates to China’s growing economy and the need 
to secure concessions of strategic resources and minerals for the future benefit of its 
economy.  Specifically, China’s rapidly rising dependence on oil and insecurity in 
the Middle East inspired China to actively pursue and obtain new avenues of 
strategic resources on the African continent.  Van Rooyen and Solomon attribute this 
to the following reasons:   
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• Firstly, African oil is generally of a higher quality than oil from most other 
countries.  Because African oil is very similar to China’s domestic oil 
product, it enables China to use its present domestic refining capabilities.   
• Secondly, African oil-producing countries tend to be highly indebted and 
impoverished, thereby raising the opportunity for oil concessions in return 
for financial, economic and military assistance.   
• Thirdly, African oil reserves are still largely untapped with less fierce 
international competition or involvement.  This affords many opportunities 
for China’s state-run oil companies to invest in African countries’ mining 
and refining capabilities.   
• Finally, it is expected that by 2010 West Africa will produce one fifth of 
the world’s oil output.   
Thus it is no surprise that China’s oil expropriation has seen a large increase in 
dependence and involvement with African oil.  In fact, China’s dependence on 
African oil is such that 25 per cent of imported oil comes from Africa, making it the 
second largest source of Chinese oil.52 
Observers point out that Africa’s oil wealth is all the more important now that 
China is investing huge sums of money on the continent.  Angola, China’s leading 
supplier of oil, for instance, has received at least $5 billion in loans and credit in 
exchange for oil.53  Generally, the need for energy and raw materials has 
accompanied China’s expansionary growth, fuelling increased Chinese investment 
on the African continent.  Chinese investments reached $11,7 billion in 2006, 
including investments in the manufacturing, trade, transport and agricultural 
sectors.54 
According to Obadina, the rapid growth in the flow of resources between 
China and Africa does indicate that China will increasingly rival Europe and the 
U.S. as Africa’s key trading partner in the 21st century.  This is mirrored in the 
following statistics: In the first six years of this decade, trade between Africa and 
China increased from a little under $10 billion to about $60 billion in 2006.  China 
has become Africa’s third largest trade partner, and is set to soon rise to second 
largest.  The Chinese government expects that bilateral trade will reach $100 billion 
by 2010.55 
Finally, it could be argued that as much as the birth of AFRICOM is not a 
direct result of Chinese strategic engagement in Africa, it is certainly of great 
relevance to current and future U.S. strategic interests in Africa.  After all, U.S. 
policymakers have noted Africa’s growing strategic importance to U.S. interests − 
and among those interests is the growing importance of Africa’s natural resources, 
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particularly energy resources.  AFRICOM’s establishment will certainly increase the 
American profile and presence on the African continent and coincides with China’s 
growing economy and the need to secure concessions of strategic resources and 
minerals for the future benefit of its economy.  Thus Chinese involvement is not 
without consequences to the U.S. role and strategic involvement on the African 
continent.  At the same time, from a U.S. and AFRICOM point of view, Washington 
could be expected to avoid any action that could spark American-Chinese conflict in 
Africa or even create the impression of fierce competition over scarce resources, 
influence and power.  Moreover, the U.S. seems to be careful not to create a 
situation where competition over influence on the African continent would cause a 
rift between the U.S. and China.  Following a visit to China, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defence for East Asia, David Sedney, reported in a briefing to the 
Pentagon on 3 March 2008 that he had “very successful” discussions about 
AFRICOM and how the U.S. and China can work together with African nations and 
regional organisations.   
We had discussions about Africa.  We had a presentation on the 
formation of AFRICOM, and the Chinese gave us a presentation on 
their role in Africa …  And we agree to continue discussions on 
Africa in the military field, and I think that’s a very positive thing.   
Sedney also stated that neither the U.S. nor China would like to see Africa as a 
forum for conflict or competition between the U.S. and China, but rather pursue co-
operation with a view to addressing the many needs in Africa, including in the field 
of security.56 
Generally, there is indeed much more to AFRICOM than securing oil supplies 
from Africa for the U.S. and it would, therefore, be a mistake to view and consider 
AFRICOM solely or narrowly against the background of U.S. strategic interest over 
strategic resources and minerals in a competitive international community.  Rather, 
it could be argued that − despite current reservations on the African continent about 
any meaningful role for AFRICOM − the Command could indeed play a 
constructive multilateral role in Africa‘s security challenges in the near future, 
specifically in terms of strengthening U.S.-African security co-operation. 
Future U.S.-Africa security co-operation 
In view of the above, the pressing question is: where does this leave 
AFRICOM?  Malan’s suggestion is that beyond military counter-terrorism, 
AFRICOM should focus on two primary and unashamed military support roles, 
namely, firstly, defence-sector reform, including civil-military relations; and 
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secondly, support to building African peacekeeping and standby capacity.  This 
implies a role in building more professional armed forces and entrenching the 
democratic principle of civil supremacy over the military.  Furthermore, this implies 
a demonstrable commitment by AFRICOM to provide long-term, sustainable 
support to developing African peacekeeping capabilities – for participating in UN 
peacekeeping, as well as AU and regional peacekeeping. “These roles are indeed 
envisioned by the DoD but they are not writ at this point,” Malan argues.57  Against 
this background the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) is of special 
interest.   
Significant progress was made in recent years with the development of a 
cohesive African peace and security system when African defence functionaries met 
in Addis Ababa in May 2003 where they agreed on the modalities of an ASF.58  The 
notion of an ASF is basically intended to institute a multi-national force empowered 
to intervene in serious conflicts around the troubled continent.  The aim is to provide 
the AU and other role-players on the African continent with a firmer foundation for 
undertaking peacekeeping endeavours and thus to move towards a less ad hoc way 
of responding to crises than in past years.  In terms of the AU policy framework, the 
ASF will be deployed under the auspices of the AU to intervene in border wars and 
internal conflict.  Institutionally, it will consist of five sub-regionally-based brigades 
(3 000 to 4 000 troops each) in addition to a sixth, continental, formation based at 
the AU's headquarters at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  This will provide the AU with a 
combined standby capacity of 15 000 to 20 000 peacekeepers towards 2010 as the 
target date.59 
The ASF clearly represents a serious political intention on the part of African 
leaders to set up a multi-national military force empowered to intervene in serious 
conflicts around the troubled continent.  African leaders seem to be keen to avoid a 
repeat of genocide, such as in Rwanda in 1994, when extremists from the Hutu 
majority slaughtered an estimated 800 000 minority Tutsis and Hutu moderates in 
100 days of killings.  Yet, more than mere political will and commitment is needed 
as peacekeeping operations are immensely costly affairs played out in messy 
theatres.  A logistically related factor, such as adequate funding for airlift resources, 
is crucial in rapid deployment and indeed a cause for concern in the African context.  
With no airlift, virtually no peacekeeping operation is possible − to mention only 
one of many pressing operational factors.  Currently, very few African states have 
any strategic lift capabilities worth mentioning.  If the ASF is to be worthy of the 
‘standby’ in its name, strategic lift and related logistical support in the field will 
have to be in place.60 
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Historically speaking, some challenges encountered by the now defunct 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) dating back to the operation in Chad (1981) 
seem to remain challenges in the African context.  Considering some of the most 
serious peacekeeping challenges that the AU had to deal with in Burundi and Sudan 
(Darfur) in recent years, it could be stated that the African continent is still battling 
with some of the ‘old OAU challenges’, most notably inadequate allocation of 
financial and logistical resources.  While there is no lack of political support for the 
development of the ASF, valid concerns persist about the financial implications of 
implementing AU objectives.   
Put differently, Africa’s main security challenge is to mobilise sufficient 
resources to provide a secure, stable and well-governed environment that is 
underpinned by the rule of law, human rights and civil liberties.  There are great 
expectations of the AU being able to rapidly deploy the long-desired ASF as a Pan-
African ideal.  But recent peacekeeping experience has revealed that the AU suffers 
from a lack of strategic management capacity, it has no effective mechanisms for 
operational level mission management, has insufficient logistical support and ability 
to manage logistics, lacks capacity in communication and information systems, and 
is totally dependent on external partners.61  Hence, De Coning rightly argues that the 
AU and African regional organisations do not have the capacity to undertake 
complex peacekeeping operations on their own.62   
This said, Solomon and Du Rand rightly argue that the focus of peacekeeping 
operations is shifting towards a more integrated approach, including reconstruction, 
development, stability, civilian involvement and humanitarian aspects.  This 
integrated approach to peace on the African continent demands even more resources 
from a cash-strapped continent and, in turn, necessitates wider international support.  
In short, Africa cannot go it alone in providing the stability which is essential for 
development.63  In view of the above, Malan argues that AFRICOM could and 
should make a concerted effort to assist the AU in overcoming some of the “critical 
capacity gaps”.64  Mpyisi likewise states that if the U.S. genuinely wishes to ensure 
the long-term stability in Africa, it should ensure full support for endogenous 
initiatives by supporting the African peace and security architecture and, in 
particular, the ASF.65 
From the American side, not too much has been said about peacekeeping in 
Africa, but it is acknowledged that “[d]espite a willingness to participate in these 
(peacekeeping) operations, many African militaries lack the command and control, 
training, equipment, and logistics capability to effectively participate in such 
efforts”.  Clearly, the U.S. has recognised the need to enhance peacekeeping 
capabilities on the African continent.66  For AFRICOM this could indeed be a point 
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of departure for strengthening U.S.-African security co-operation and to create new 
opportunities to bolster the capabilities of Africa role-players. 
Conclusion 
Although U.S. military engagement in Africa is by no means something new, 
the creation of AFRICOM is certainly of great interest and has heightened some 
serious concerns among African role-players and in the U.S.  From a U.S. 
government point of view, there are undoubtedly a number of unresolved issues.  
These range from Congressional funding to the status of current military, economic, 
humanitarian, counterterrorism and information programmes in a number of African 
states.  Politically speaking, the question is how the U.S. government would ensure 
that military efforts do not overshadow or contradict U.S. military and diplomatic 
efforts and objectives in Africa.67  Practically speaking, little more than the forging 
of initial partnerships and the establishment of its Africa-based headquarters or 
logistics hub in the region is likely in the immediate future. 
From an African point of view, some observers question the timing of 
AFRICOM’s birth as a few decades too late to make a lasting and decisive impact 
on the continent’s burgeoning crises and development challenges.  Some others are 
more optimistic and they adapt a better-late-than-never approach to the advent of a 
more coherent U.S. military approach on the continent.68  For the latter, the 
establishment of AFRICOM may well be promising in terms of a closer approach to 
U.S. military engagement with the continent.69  Moreover, it is still early days and 
one could somehow find that support for AFRICOM might be in the interest of some 
African states but not others.  Djibouti, for instance, has different interests and 
concerns than other countries, like South Africa.  After all, this explains Djibouti’s 
decision to allow thousands of American soldiers on its soil to ‘fight terrorism’, 
while other countries are seemingly opposed to it. 
For the U.S., ideally speaking, AFRICOM may become an important vehicle 
to sustain U.S. involvement in Africa and to contribute towards a more positive 
image of the U.S. and its military in Africa.  At the same time, the creation of 
AFRICOM could raise Africa’s strategic profile in the U.S. as well as other parts of 
the world.  African militaries indeed stand to benefit from the creation of AFRICOM 
in terms of military-diplomatic opportunities and tangible means.  At the same time, 
AFRICOM may be the first real test for sustainable U.S. involvement in Africa.70 
In the final analysis, Swart is probably correct that much about the future of 
AFRICOM would depend on whether the U.S. could convince role-players on the 
African continent that there is indeed a genuine interest in ending conflict, insecurity 
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and underdevelopment in Africa through the provision of sustained assistance to 
African countries – which implies that AFRICOM will be more than a project 
whereby only the U.S. stands to gain in the long term,71 and what is narrowly aimed 
at pursuing U.S. strategic interests on the African continent.  In other words, the 
nature of the engagement and the manner in which AFRICOM will be presented to a 
seemingly not-so-receptive or sceptical African audience will be pivotal to whether 
or not AFRICOM will succeed.  This implies that diplomacy will be critical in the 
new strategic approach towards Africa.72  At the same time, African role-players 
probably need to realise that there is a lot of criticism and even hostility when the 
U.S. talks about promoting its national interests in Africa, but at the same time, there 
is the expectation that the U.S. will provide assistance to Africa.  It should be 
understood that the U.S., like any other nation, uses its resources to promote national 
interests, not out of altruism.  This does not necessarily suggest that the U.S. wants 
to or should impose its will on Africa or that it wants to control the continent, but 
there must be some balance in which Africans recognise that the U.S. will only play 
an active role if doing so is in its national interest. 
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